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Research
Original incident-response research, field evidence and analysis.
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Could You Investigate Misuse of Claude in Your Own Environment?
Can you investigate Claude misuse? Only if evidence collection was configured before the incident. See what Claude Enterprise, Team, Code, and Cowork actually record.

A GitHub token was stolen. Now what?
A stolen GitHub Personal Access Token exposes every repo an identity can reach, and the secrets inside. How to scope the blast radius, investigate, and harden fast.

Forensic Frustrations in Google Workspace
Licensing gaps, log delay, and OAuth correlation limits break IR in Google Workspace. Two real cases on what you can and can't investigate, plus fixes.

Borrowed Trust, Badly Done
A legitimate mailbox sends an AI-written invoice lure that chains AWS S3 to Cloudflare to a fake Google login. Analysis, IOCs, and how to defend.
Frontier Forensics: Open AI
Explore what forensic evidence OpenAI leaves behind, including logs, retention, auditability, and provenance across AI systems.
Device code phishing in Entra ID: what the sign-in logs actually show
Device code phishing leaves a distinctive pair in Entra ID sign-in logs — an authentication with no interactive client, then a redemption from elsewhere. Here is the query and why Conditional Access missed it.

The Silent SaaS Threat: Part 3 – The Response Playbook
A five-step Entra ID response playbook for malicious OAuth apps: detect rogue consents, assess blast radius via Graph permissions, contain, analyze, eradicate.

Incident Response in Kubernetes (AKS)
Maps AKS log sources for IR: why Kubernetes Audit and Guard logs are off by default, Automatic mode's forensic limits, and detection via Entra ID/NSG flow logs.

Incident Response in Kubernetes (EKS)
Details EKS log sources for IR: API server, audit and authenticator logs, CloudTrail/VPC Flow Log correlation, and pod forensics for fileless malware.

The Missing Link: AADGraphActivityLogs Finally Arrives
Entra ID's new AADGraphActivityLogs table closes the legacy Azure AD Graph API blind spot, exposing activity from tools like AADInternals and ROADtools.
Atlas Lion: Tactics, History & Defenses
Threat profile of Atlas Lion (Storm-0539): gift-card fraud via AiTM phishing and rogue device registration in Azure/M365, with MFA and Conditional Access.
Incident Response in the Neocloud - Lambda Cloud (Part 2)
Closing our Neocloud IR series, we map Lambda Cloud's identity model, structure, and audit logging, detailing what evidence responders can pull from lambda.ai.
The Silent SaaS Threat: Part 2 – The Proactive Playbook
Part 2 of this SaaS series covers hardening Entra ID against OAuth abuse: admin consent workflows, delegated vs application permissions, credential hygiene.
The Poisoned Pipeline: Axios Supply Chain Attack
Analysis of the Axios npm compromise: trojanized versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 deployed a cross-platform RAT via CI/CD pipelines, with IOCs and remediation steps.
The Invisible Architecture of Modern Phishing
How a 2026 AiTM campaign chained ConvertKit email delivery, a compromised small-business page, and Akamai/Linode-hosted scripts to harvest M365 sessions.
The Silent SaaS Threat: The 5 Questions
A five-question checklist for gauging OAuth and SaaS sprawl risk in Entra, drawing on patterns from the Salesloft Drift and Midnight Blizzard intrusions.
Incident Response in the Neocloud - Nebius (Part I)
Part 1 of our Neocloud IR series maps Nebius's AWS-like IAM and logging architecture, plus the open-source Invictus-Nebius script for forensic data acquisition.

The story of how we almost got hacked
How Invictus tracked a BEC actor's AiTM phishing campaign built on EvilProxy, from a WeTransfer HTML lure to infrastructure uncovered via passive DNS pivoting.
Profiling Silk Typhoon: Tactics, History & Defenses
Threat actor profile of Silk Typhoon (HAFNIUM): Exchange Server zero-days, the CVE-2025-3928 Commvault Metallic exploit on Azure, and OAuth/Graph/EWS abuse.
Anatomy of a BEC in 2025
A Microsoft 365 BEC case study: a SharePoint-hosted PDF phishing lure led to mass outbound emails, tracing 2025 threat-actor tactics and detection gaps.
A Candid Perspective on the Cloud Threat Landscape: A Recap from fwd:cloudsec EU
Recap of Invictus's fwd:cloudsec EU talk: cloud threat actor trends, attack patterns, and a catalog of 70+ cloud TTPs for defenders and detection engineers.
Profiling Sea Turtle: Tactics, History & Defenses
Threat actor profile of Sea Turtle: DNS hijacking, zero-day exploitation, and AWS/Azure credential theft via security-group edits enabling SSH access.
Introducing KubeForenSys: A Kubernetes Forensic Collection Framework for Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS)
KubeForenSys is Invictus's open-source AKS forensic tool, unifying Kubernetes API events, RBAC changes, and pod activity into a single incident timeline.
Profiling TraderTraitor: Tactics, History & Defenses
Threat actor profile of TraderTraitor: supply chain compromise and credential theft against AWS-hosted crypto platforms, tied to the Ronin and Bybit heists.
Profiling Laundry Bear: Tactics, History & Defenses
Threat actor profile of Laundry Bear (Void Blizzard): pass-the-cookie attacks, Evilginx AitM phishing, and password spraying against M365 and Entra ID.
Profiling JavaGhost: Tactics, History & Defenses
Threat actor profile of JavaGhost: stolen IAM keys abused for SES phishing, CloudTrail evasion via GetFederationToken, and API Gateway-Lambda persistence.
Cloud Incident Readiness: Critical infrastructure for cloud incident response
Part three of a cloud readiness series on IR infrastructure: Azure Log Analytics, Sentinel, and storage accounts set up for root cause analysis and containment.
Cloud Heavy, Hybrid Ready: Lessons from BlackBasta and Scattered Spider
Analysis of leaked BlackBasta chat logs and Scattered Spider TTPs: RaaS techniques for hybrid environments vs. cloud-native identity attacks, and IR takeaways.
Cloud Incident Readiness: Key logs for cloud incidents
Part two of a cloud readiness series ranking must-have, should-have, and nice-to-have logs across Azure, AWS, and GCP for investigating cloud incidents.
Deep Dive: Forensic Analysis of eM Client
Forensic analysis of eM Client abuse in M365 BEC cases: registration, sign-in and forwarding-rule artifacts in Entra ID and Unified Audit Logs, keyed to app ID.
Locked Out, Dropboxed In: When BEC threats innovate
An AiTM case where the threat actor abused eM Client's IMAP.AccessAsUser.All for persistence, then registered Dropbox and WeTransfer accounts to keep phishing.
Cloud Incident Readiness: A Practical Playbook for CISOs and Teams
Part one of a cloud readiness series: practical steps for provisioning emergency access across Azure, AWS, and GCP ahead of an IR engagement starting.
Responding to Adversary in the Middle attacks
How Adversary-in-the-Middle phishing bypasses MFA in Microsoft 365, with log-based detection, response steps, and prevention guidance from BEC casework.
This Is How We Do It: Resolving Microsoft Cloud Incidents Like Pros
How Invictus streamlined Microsoft 365 and Azure incident response using a multi-tenant Graph API app for one-click log acquisition and automated processing.
Cloud native incident response in AWS - Part II
Part two of our AWS IR series: using Athena and Glue to query CloudTrail, VPC Flow, S3, ELB and CloudFront logs, plus partitioning and nested field parsing.
Cloud native incident response in AWS - Part I
Part one of a series on native AWS incident response methodology: the investigative approach, log sources, and analysis tooling drawn from real AWS compromises.
A deep dive into Entra ID Identity Protection for Incident Response
A deep dive into Microsoft Entra ID Protection's risky user, sign-in, and workload identity reports, and how to use that data during incident response.
The Azure log you probably didn’t know existed
An overview of Azure's Directory Activity Log, the tenant-scoped log recording Global Administrator permission changes, useful in incident investigations.
The Microsoft Graph for Unified Audit Log acquisitions is here!
Microsoft's auditLogQuery Graph API now supports Unified Audit Log acquisition, with the Microsoft-Extractor-Suite automating the query and retrieval workflow.
What DFIR experts need to know about the current state of the Unified Audit Log
Post-Storm-0558 changes to the M365 Unified Audit Log: extended 180-day retention, new Premium events like MailItemsAccessed, and Graph API acquisition.
The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me
An AWS incident walkthrough: a threat actor abusing Simple Email Service sending limits after credential compromise, with a full MITRE-mapped timeline.
Do not use the Get-MgAuditLogSignIn for your investigations!
Get-MgAuditLogSignIn omits the Authentication Protocol field needed to spot Device Code phishing. Get-MgBetaAuditLogSignIn returns complete Entra sign-in data.

AWS CloudTrail cheat sheet
A cheat sheet of high-signal AWS CloudTrail event names for faster incident triage, built from real IR engagements to help responders spot malicious activity.
Ransomware in the cloud
A ransomware case in AWS traced to an exposed long-term IAM key, with SES quota-call reconnaissance and a CloudTrail 90-day retention gap limiting visibility.
A Defenders Guide to GraphRunner — Part II
Part II of the GraphRunner defender's guide: pillage modules for SharePoint, OneDrive, mailbox, and Teams data theft, plus abuse prevention guidance.
A Defenders Guide to GraphRunner — Part I
Part I of a defender's guide to GraphRunner, the Entra ID post-exploitation tool: authentication, recon, and persistence modules, with IoCs and KQL queries.
Everything you need to know about the MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs
How Microsoft Graph Activity Logs close the Graph API auditing gaps exposed by Storm-0558 and SolarWinds, covering licensing, ingestion and KQL analysis.
Automated AWS Incident Response — The next episode
Feature update for Invictus-AWS, our open-source AWS IR tool: automated CloudTrail acquisition, service enumeration, and analysis for faster investigations.
5 Tips to prevent or limit the impact of an incident in Azure
Five low-cost Azure controls to limit incident impact: budget alerts, app registration limits, subscription policies, audit logging, collaboration controls.
Automated First-Response in AWS using Sigma and Athena
Research testing 32 AWS attack techniques via Stratus Red Team: Sigma rules queried via Athena outperformed GuardDuty at detecting malicious CloudTrail events.
Importing Windows Event Log files into Splunk
Configures Splunk to parse exported .evtx files via the preprocess-winevt sourcetype, avoiding the merged-event errors seen with the default wineventlog type.
The Evolution of Business Email Compromise
Business Email Compromise TTPs from a Microsoft 365 case: spearphishing link access, internal lateral phishing, and evidence collection via Extractor Suite.
Welcome 👋 Microsoft Extractor Suite
Introducing the Microsoft Extractor Suite: a modular PowerShell tool for acquiring Unified Audit Logs, Azure AD sign-in/audit logs, and OAuth app data.
Responding to an attack in AWS
Final part of an AWS investigation: CloudTrail analysis of an unauthorized IAM user, EC2 Session Manager lateral movement, and database exfiltration to S3.
Incident Response in Azure
Details how Entra ID cross-tenant sync can be abused for persistence, which Audit Log activities expose the attacker tenant ID, and a KQL hunting query.
Set up Splunk for Incident Response in GCP in 15 minutes..
A walkthrough for deploying a Windows Splunk instance on Google Cloud Platform in 15 minutes, for ingesting and analysing incident response log evidence.
Responding to macOS attacks — Part II
Second in the macOS attack series: Persistence and Privilege Escalation via Launch Agents and Launch Daemons, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK with forensic artefacts.
Top 5 Windows Events for Incident Response
A ranked walkthrough of five Windows Event IDs incident responders rely on most, including 1149 for RDP auth, 4698 for scheduled tasks, and 4624 for logons.
Responding to a Cobalt Strike attack — Part III
Part three covers memory forensics for in-memory Cobalt Strike payloads: full memory image versus process dump analysis of PowerShell-injected beacons.
Responding to a Cobalt Strike attack — Part II
Part two on Cobalt Strike delivery mechanisms: scripted web drive-by payloads, HTML applications, Office macros, and static analysis of a beacon executable.
Responding to a Cobalt Strike attack — Part I
Part one of a Cobalt Strike IR series: OSINT and threat intelligence methods to identify beacon infrastructure and C2 activity during an active investigation.
Responding to macOS attacks — Part I
First in a series mapping macOS attacks to MITRE ATT&CK: Initial Access and Execution techniques with artefacts from real malware and adversary emulation.